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Intuitionistic Logic and Elementary Rules  
LLOYD HUMBERSTONE AND DAVID MAKINSON  
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The interplay of introduction and elimination rules for propositional connectives is often seen as suggesting 
a distinguished role for intuitionistic logic. We prove three formal results concerning intuitionistic 
propositional logic that bear on that perspective, and discuss their significance. First, for a range of 
connectives including both negation and the falsum, there are no classically or intuitionistically correct 
introduction rules. Second, irrespective of the choice of negation or the falsum as a primitive connective, 
classical and intuitionistic consequence satisfy exactly the same structural, introduction and elimination 
(briefly, elementary) rules. Third, for falsum as primitive only, intuitionistic consequence is the least 
consequence relation that satisfies all classically correct elementary rules.    
 
1. Background and purpose 
 
Philosophical discussions of introduction and elimination rules for the logical connectives 
are often conducted with a foundational agenda in mind.
 
The plan is to build a formal 
justification for intuitionistic logic by (i) marking out in terms independent of any prior 
choice of logic a natural class of structural, introduction and elimination rules for 
connectives, such that (ii) the intuitionistic consequence relation may be shown to be the 
least consequence relation satisfying such rules, while (iii) no such construction is 
possible for classical consequence. 
 
As was shown by the celebrated ‘tonk’ example of Prior (1960), one cannot carry out the 
plan simply by taking the class of all possible introduction and elimination rules; it must 
be a proper subclass. But the task of isolating an appropriate subclass without taking any 
particular logic for granted, as needed for the foundationalist project, has proven to be 
recalcitrant. Despite decades of work, there is no consensus of success.
1
  
 
If, on the other hand, we abandon the foundational goal, and accept as our working 
system classical logic with its usual semantics, we have a quite different perspective for 
studying intuitionistic logic. In that context, we may deploy the notion of classical 
consequence with complete freedom on any level without fear of circularity.  
 
In certain limited respects, it has been quite customary to take such a classical 
perspective. For example, when presenting semantics for intuitionistic logic, authors 
often work in a classical meta-language, perhaps noting for the record any points at 
which their reasoning about intuitionistic logic uses principles that are not acceptable 
within it. An instance of this is the standard proof of the completeness of intuitionistic 
logic with respect to its Kripke semantics.
2
 In a certain sense, this gives us a classical 
account of intuitionistic logic.  
 
Another familiar use of the classical perspective arises on the syntactic side. Proof 
systems for intuitionistic logic may be obtained by imposing a simple restriction on a 
parameter in suitable presentations of classical logic. This is already done in the work of 
Gentzen (1934). His system LK for classical logic uses generalized sequents, which allow 
an arbitrary finite set of formulas on the right of each sequent, where they are understood 
disjunctively in contrast to the conjunctive reading on the left. As Gentzen observed, we 
may obtain intuitionistic consequence by choosing for classical consequence a suitable 
rule system using generalized sequents, constraining its rules never to have more than one 
formula on the right of their conclusion sequents, and then selecting from the provable 
sequents those in which there is exactly one formula on the right. 
  
However, this characterization of intuitionistic logic in terms of classical logic is 
potentially presentation-dependent. It obtains the intuitionistic consequence relation by 
restricting certain delicately chosen sequent postulates for its classical counterpart. 
Without further work, one has no guarantee that small changes in the classical postulates 
selected may not spoil the picture.   
 
In contrast, the relationships that we establish in this paper are more robust. They concern 
the entire class of elementary rules, rather than a particular selection from among them, 
and focus on the consequence relations themselves, rather than specific presentations. We 
show that in the propositional case, with sequents understood as containing a single 
formula on the right, the following hold. First, there are no classically (or 
intuitionistically) correct introduction rules for a range of connectives, including both 
negation and the falsum. Second, irrespective of the choice of negation or the falsum as a 
primitive connective, the two consequence relations satisfy exactly the same structural, 
introduction and elimination (briefly, elementary) rules. Third, when the falsum rather 
than negation is taken as primitive, intuitionistic consequence is precisely the least 
consequence relation that satisfies all classically correct elementary rules. In the final 
section, we discuss the significance of these three results for the foundational programme.  
 
2. Elementary rules for sequents 
 
All definitions and results are formulated for propositional logic. The question of their 
extension to the first-order context is discussed briefly at the end of section 3.  
 
Consider a propositional language with sentence letters p1, p2, … and a collection of 
finitary connectives, for example, but not necessarily, &, , , or &, , , . For this 
paper, a sequent is any expression A   where  is a formula and A is a finite and 
possibly empty set (rather than a multiset or sequence) of formulas of the propositional 
language. So defined, sequents contain a single formula on the right in contrast with 
generalized sequents, which may contain more than one, or none. For emphasis, we  
sometimes call them set/formula sequents as opposed to set/set sequents. As usual in this 
context, we reduce clutter by writing {1, … , n} as 1, … , n and using standard 
conventions to minimize parentheses for grouping.   
 
Let n  0, and fix n1 sequents A1  1, … , An  n , B   in that order. This 
determines an (n1)-ary rule for sequents, consisting of all substitution instances of the 
(n1)-tuple A1  1, … , An  n , B  . It is understood intuitively as authorizing 
passage from any substitution instance of the first n sequents to the corresponding 
substitution instance of the last one; this will be marked by writing a slash before the last 
sequent and calling it the conclusion-sequent of the rule, while the first n items are 
premiss-sequents. We omit angle brackets when no confusion is possible, and for brevity 
speak simply of rules, always understood as rules for sequents.  
 
From the definition, each n-premiss rule has an underlying tuple, which clearly is not 
unique, but is so up to injective relettering of its sentence letters and permutation of its 
premiss-sequents, and we abuse terminology a little by speaking of ‘the’ underlying 
tuple. 
 
We say that a rule is elementary iff its underlying tuple A1  1, … , An  n / B   
satisfies the following condition: all formulas in all n1 sequents are sentence letters 
except for at most one, in which case it is of the form (p1, … , pk) for some k-place 
connective  and sentence letters p1, … , pk (not necessarily distinct) and occurs exactly 
once, either on the left or the right of the conclusion-sequent. 
 
When the tuple consists entirely of sentence letters, thus with no occurrence of any 
connective, it is called a structural rule. Three well-known examples of structural rules 
are the finite-premiss versions of reflexivity, monotonicity and cumulative transitivity 
(alias cut),
3
 which together are customarily called the rules for consequence relations.
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When the connective appears just once then, if it is on the right side of the conclusion-
sequent we say we have an introduction rule, while if it is on the left, we have an 
elimination rule.
5
  
 
Our requirement that there is at most one occurrence of the connective in the underlying 
tuple for the rule is quite standard. If the connective does occur, we require that it be in 
the conclusion-sequent B   of the tuple. For elimination rules, that is more restrictive 
than sometimes required, and we will see later (in comments on the Lemma in the next 
section) how the definition of an elimination rule may be relaxed by a notch in this 
respect without affecting the results of the paper.  
 
A sequent A   is understood to be classically valid iff  is a classical consequence of 
A; it is intuitionistically acceptable iff  is an intuitionistic consequence of A. An (n1)-
ary rule (for n  0) is called classically correct iff in each of its instances the conclusion-
sequent is classically valid when all of the premiss-sequents are; likewise it is  
intuitionistically correct iff in each of its instances the conclusion-sequent is 
intuitionistically acceptable when all of the premiss-sequents are.  
 
Notice that that a classically or intuitionistically correct introduction or elimination rule 
can be degenerate in the sense that it is also an instance of a correspondingly correct 
structural rule. For example, the zero-premiss rule with underlying tuple p, p&q  p is 
simultaneously an elimination rule for &, as we have defined it,and an instance of the 
structural rule with underlying tuple p, q  p.  
 
Finally, we recall a well-known fact about the relationship between intuitionistically and 
classically correct rules, together with its short proof.  
 
Fact. Every intuitionistically correct rule (elementary or not) is also classically correct.  
 
Proof. Consider any rule with underlying tuple   A1  1, … , An  n / B  , and 
suppose that it is not classically correct, so that it has an instance   A1  1, … , An 
 n / B  where each premiss-sequent is classically valid and the conclusion-
sequent is not. By the latter there is a valuation making all formulas in Btrue but  
false; take any one such valuation v and substitute for each letter p with v(p)  1 an 
intuitionistically provable formula such as pp, and for each letter p with v(p)  0 an 
intuitionistically disprovable one such as pp) or according to the choice of 
primitive connective. This gives us another instance   A1  1, … , An  n / B 
  of the tuple, and it is easy to verify that each premiss-sequent is intuitionistically 
acceptable while the conclusion-sequent is not.  
 
3. Formal results, proofs, and comments 
 
We begin with a simple observation that must surely have been noticed somewhere in the 
literature, though the authors have not been able to find it mentioned. It states that there 
are no classically or intuitionistically correct introduction rules for a broad class of 
connectives that includes negation, the falsum, and other familiar connectives. 
 
Call a k-ary truth-functional connective  contrarian iff (p1, … , pk) receives value 0 
when all of p1, … , pk are assigned the value 1 (i.e. in the first row of the truth-table, when 
k 1). This includes the falsum (vacuously, taking k  0), negation (k  1), as well as 
exclusive disjunction, ‘neither nor’ and ‘not both’ (k  2).  
 
Observation. There are no classically or intuitionistically correct introduction rules using 
set/formula sequents for any contrarian truth-functional connective. 
 
Proof of the Observation  
 
Given the Fact, it will suffice to establish the Observation for classical correctness. 
Consider any introduction rule for a contrarian k-ary connective . Its underlying tuple 
must be of the form A1  1, … , An  n / B  (p1, … , pk) where all formulas in B 
and in the premiss-sequents are sentence letters. Substitute a tautology for all sentence 
letters. Then each premiss-sequent becomes classically valid while clearly the 
conclusion-sequent does not, so the rule is not classically correct, completing the proof. 
 
Corollaries 
 
(a) For every n  1, if a connective expressing a truth-function of n arguments has a 
classically correct introduction rule using set/formula sequents, then the connective 
expressing its negation does not have one. (b) For every n  1, there are at least as many 
truth-functions of n arguments whose connectives do not have a classically correct 
introduction rule using set/formula sequents, as there are whose connectives do. 
 
Proof of the Corollaries 
 
(a) If a connective for a given function has such a rule, then by the Observation it is not 
contrarian so the top row of its table takes 1. Hence the top row of its negation takes 0, 
and thus the truth-function expressed by the negation is contrarian and so by the 
Observation has no introduction rule. (b) The passage from a given truth function to its 
negation is a bijection.  
 
Comments on the Observation 
 We comment on the scope, contrasts, dual form, and general significance of the 
Observation. Regarding scope, the restriction to set/formula sequents is essential. If 
empty right-hand sides are allowed in sequents then the Observation fails; witness the 
introduction rule for with underlying tuple p, q   / p  q, and that for  with 
underlying tuple p   / p   (noting, incidentally, that the latter introduction rule is 
degenerate, in the sense defined in Section 2). On the other hand, there is a respect in 
which the scope may be broadened: the Observation continues to hold, with the same 
proof, if we allow any number of non-contrarian connectives into the premiss-sequents 
and into the left side of the conclusion sequent of the rule.  
 
The Observation contrasts with the well-known availability of classically correct 
introduction rules for the non-contrarian connectives & in the context of 
set/formula sequents. It also contrasts with the equally familiar existence of classically 
correct elimination rules for the contrarian connectives  in the same context. For 
example, the underlying tuple ppqprovidesa classically correct zero-premiss 
elimination rule for , while q does the same for   
 
The notion for connectives dual to that of being contrarian is that of a connective forming 
compounds with value 1 when all the components have value 0 (cf. Humberstone 
forthcoming 3.18, where they are discussed under the name ‘compositional 
subcontrariety’). These connectives include negation, ‘neither nor’, ‘not both’ as well as 
the conditional and biconditional (but not the falsum or exclusive disjunction). We can 
obtain a dual form of the Observation holding for rules using only formula/set sequents, 
and thus in particular for those using only formula/formula ones: in the context of such 
sequents, there are no classically correct elimination rules for any dual-contrarian truth-
functional connective. The proof is similar, substituting a contradiction instead of a 
tautology.  
 
As to significance, the Observation explains why discussions of ‘harmony’ between 
introduction and elimination rules using set/formula sequents (see for example the 
references cited in note 1) stop short of requiring that the sets of introduction and of 
elimination rules for each connective must be non-empty. By the Observation, this is 
impossible for set/formula rules. We cannot dispense with taking some kind of contrarian 
connective as primitive and, whether we choose negation, the falsum, or a connective like 
‘neither nor’, we lack a classically or intuitionistically correct introduction rule to balance 
the elimination rule.
6
  
 
It also shows also that, when attention is restricted to elementary rules, there is no 
procedure that would, from a set of introduction rules, deliver in a one-one manner an 
appropriately corresponding set of elimination rules (cf. Dummett 1991 pp. 286–296 and 
elsewhere), since for example the set of correct introduction rules for ‘neither nor’ and 
that for ‘not and’ coincide (both being the empty set) while their sets of correct 
elimination rules do not.  
 
We now prove a lemma that tells us that as far as elementary rules are concerned, 
classical and intuitionistic logic are indistinguishable. 
 
Lemma. Irrespective of whether  or is taken as primitive (along with &, ,  the 
intuitionistically correct elementary rules are exactly the classically correct elementary 
rules.  
 
Proof of the Lemma 
 
As already remarked in the initial Fact, every intuitionistically correct rule is classically 
correct so, restricting attention to elementary rules, we need only prove the converse. We 
first establish it for the case that is taken as primitive (along with &, , ) and then 
show how the argument may be adapted for primitive .  
 
Case 1: The primitives are &, , Take any elementary rule with underlying tuple  
 A1  1, … , An  n / B  , and suppose that it is classically correct; we want to 
show that it is intuitionistically correct. The general strategy is to massage  into a single 
classically valid sequent , show that  is intuitionistically acceptable, and conclude that 
the rule with underlying tuple  is intuitionistically correct. 
 
Consider the sequent   (A11), … , (Ann)  B corresponding to the 
tuple . It is constructed by transforming each sequent of the elementary rule into a 
conditional formula whose consequent (e.g. 1) is the right formula of the sequent and 
whose antecedent (e.g. A1) is the conjunction of all the left formulas of the sequent, 
and replacing the slash sign / of the rule by a sequent separator . We claim that this 
sequent is classically valid. For suppose there is a valuation v with v(left())  1 and 
v(right())  0. Take the function  that substitutes a tautology for every letter that is true 
under v and a contradiction for every letter that is false under v (cf. the substitution in the 
proof of the Fact in section 2). Then each (Aii) is a tautology while (B) is a 
contradiction, so that the rule with underlying tuple  is not classically correct, contrary to 
hypothesis. 
 
Since the rule is elementary, each formula i and all formulas in the sets Ai are sentence 
letters, while either (Subcase 1.1) all of the formulas in B are sentence letters but  
applies a connective to sentence letters, or (Subcase 1.2) one of the formulas in B applies 
a connective to sentence letters while  and all other formulas in B are sentence letters.  
 
In Subcase 1.1, the sequent  is clear in the sense that the connective  does not occur 
anywhere within the scope of a disjunction or within the antecedent of a conditional. But 
it is known from work of Belnap, Thomason and Hazen,
8 
 and easily verified using the 
Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic, that clear sequents (in the language with &, , 
,  as primitives) are classically valid iff they are intuitionistically acceptable. It 
follows that the sequent  is intuitionistically acceptable, and thus that the rule with 
underlying tuple  is also intuitionistically correct, as desired.  
 
In Subcase 1.2,  may not be clear, since  can occur in one of the formulas in B and 
thus within the antecedent of the conditional B. In this situation, B may be 
taken to be of the form (p1… &pm&(qr))s where p1,… , pm, q,r,s are sentence 
letters. We form the sequent  by moving the conjunct qr from the right of the  in  
to become an element on the left. That is, we put  to be the sequent (A11),… , 
(Ann), (qr)  (p1&… pm)s, which is intuitionistically equivalent to . But 
 is clear, so we may apply the same result as in Case 1 to conclude that it is 
intuitionistically acceptable, so again  is intuitionistically acceptable and the rule with 
underlying tuple  is also intuitionistically correct, as needed to complete the proof for 
the case where  rather than  is primitive. 
 
Case 2: The primitives are &, , In this case, if the definition of clarity is left 
unchanged then the Belnap/Thomason/Hazen equivalence fails; witness the sequent p 
 p, which has no occurrences of  and so is vacuously clear, but is not 
intuitionistically correct. However, one can reformulate the definition of clarity so as to 
recover the equivalence in that context. Take a formula in the language with &, , 
, primitive to be clear iff no occurrence of  or of  is in the scope of an occurrence 
of  or of , nor is in the left scope of an occurrence of .  
 
Then it is not difficult to re-prove the Belnap/Thomason/Hazen equivalence in this 
context, either by re-running one of the available proofs, for example that in Hazen 1990 
or the later one in subsection 7.14 of Humberstone forthcoming, or else via translation 
from the language of  to that of . We may then continue as in Case 1, repeating the 
argument for Subcase 1.2 to cover also the situation where  occurs in one of the 
formulas in B. We omit the details.  
 
Comments on the Lemma 
 
This Lemma explains (as was remarked by a referee) why textbook natural deduction 
systems for classical propositional logic with set/formula inferences invariably have 
recourse to at least one rule (for negation or for the falsum) that is not elementary. For if 
they didn't, then by the Lemma they could not yield any more than intuitionistic logic.  
 
Of course, recalling Gentzen’s remark mentioned in section 1, if we enlarge the context 
from sequents as they are understood here to generalized sequents, then not all classically 
correct elementary sequents will be intuitionistically correct. For example, with more 
than one formula on the right, the classically correct sequent   ,  counts as an 
introduction rule (zero-premiss, empty left hand side, multiple right hand side), although 
it is not intuitionistically correct.  
 
Even within the context of set/formula sequents, one may obtain classical logic by 
enlarging the set of elementary rules. For example, we may do so by allowing a single 
connective to occur twice in an allowed position (as in the zero-premiss rule of double 
negation elimination, when negation is primitive). We can also do it by permitting a 
connective to occur once on the left of a premiss-sequent (as in the rule with underlying 
tuple p,qr  s, p,q  s / p  s which, when the falsum is primitive and negation 
defined gives us as an instance p,q  s, p,q  s / p  s ).9 And of course, one may 
obtain classical logic by using more than one connective in a rule.  
 
Nevertheless, certain enlargements may be made without destroying the Lemma. For 
example we may allow empty right hand sides in sequents, without affecting it, as is 
easily shown by replacing the empty set by the falsum and re-running the proof. Even 
within the context of set/formula sequents, the definition of what counts as an elementary 
rule may be broadened by a notch without damage to the Lemma. Specifically, we may 
also include all rules in which the unique occurrence of the connective is on the right of 
some premiss-sequent.  Indeed, this is the most common form employed for presenting 
systems of natural deduction by means of sequent-to-sequent rules (as, for example, in 
section 4.1 of Dummett 2000). With this broadening, the unique occurrence of the 
connective can be anywhere except on the left of a premiss-sequent, and it may be 
checked that the above argument for the Lemma continues to goes through unchanged.
 
  
 
One might speculate that the Lemma can be generalized to say that exactly the same 
elementary rules are correct for any two intermediate consequence relations (that is, 
consequence relations that include intuitionistic and are included in classical 
consequence).  However, that is not the case. Rautenberg 1986 has remarked that an 
intermediate consequence relation need not satisfy the intuitionistically correct 
elementary rule for  introduction A, p  q / A  pq. A simple illustration of this 
possibility is given in Humberstone 2006. Nevertheless, any elementary rule that is 
correct for a given intermediate consequence relation is intuitionistically correct, despite 
the failure of the converse. For the same argument as used in the proof of the initial Fact 
in section 2 shows, more generally, that any rule for sequents (whether elementary or not) 
that is correct for a given intermediate consequence relation is also correct for classical 
consequence. Then, applying the Lemma, we may conclude that every elementary rule 
that is satisfied by the given intermediate consequence is also intuitionistically correct.  
 
Our third result, which focuses on the consequence relations generated by elementary 
rules, follows easily from the Lemma.  
 
Theorem. For the language with &, , ,  as primitive (but not when is primitive): 
intuitionistic propositional consequence is the least consequence relation over that 
language that satisfies all classically correct elementary rules.  
  
Proof of the Theorem 
 
By the identity given in the Lemma, it suffices to show that intuitionistic propositional 
consequence is the least among the consequence relations over that language that satisfy 
all intuitionistically correct elementary rules. Evidently it is one such relation; and that it 
is the least (i.e. included in every such relation) follows from the well-known existence of 
a set/formula axiomatization of intuitionistic logic using only elementary rules with the 
mentioned choice of primitives. Several such presentations are available, deriving from 
the systems NJ and LJ of Gentzen 1934 (see for example Dummett 2000, Section 4.2, but 
dropping the rule of thinning on the right as well as both rules for negation, replacing the 
latter with A and ignoring, for present purposes, the quantifier rules).  
 
Comments on the Theorem 
 
The first part of the proof of the Theorem is clearly independent of the choice of  rather 
than  as primitive. However, the second part, showing that intuitionistic consequence is 
included in every such relation, does depend on that choice.
10
 Indeed, when  is taken as 
primitive it fails badly. In particular, neither the intuitionistically acceptable sequent p  
p nor even the sequent pp&p) can be derived by classically correct elementary 
rules.
11
 Thus, with  primitive instead of  we obtain a very weak subrelation of 
intuitionistic consequence that is not even congruential with respect to negation. 
 
     
 
Roughly speaking, the underlying reason for this sensitivity is that the definition of  as 
 permits the rules for  to do some of the work needed to obtain principles for , 
as may be illustrated by a typical derivation of p  p.12 In contrast, when  is taken 
as primitive its own elementary rules do not suffice for the job. It might be interesting to 
study further the least consequence relation satisfying all classically correct elementary 
rules in the language with primitive negation. We will not do so here, as our main 
concern is with intuitionistic logic itself; but the relation will play a part in the 
philosophical discussion in the next section. 
 
To end this formal section, we recall that all of our definitions and results have been 
formulated for propositional consequence. It is clear how to extend the definition of an 
elementary rule to the first-order context, and it is also clear that the Observation carries 
over. But it is not yet known whether the Lemma and the Theorem do so too; our 
conjecture is positive. 
 
4. Philosophical discussion 
 
What bearing do these results have on the project of formal foundations for intuitionistic 
logic? The answer depends in part on one’s appreciation of the role of elementary rules. 
 
On the one hand, one may take elementary rules as being of special epistemological 
significance, providing inferential meanings for the connectives in a manner that is 
philosophically preferable to truth valuations. Under this perspective, the Theorem might 
be said to strengthen the case for intuitionistic logic. With an appropriate concept of a 
sequent and with the falsum as a primitive connective (along with &, , ), whether we 
set out from the class of all intuitionistically correct sequent rules or from the class of all 
classically correct ones, restriction to the elementary rules among them gives us exactly 
intuitionistic consequence. 
 
However, to keep a sense of balance, we should note that intuitionistic consequence is not 
unique in this respect. As we have seen in the comments on the Theorem, when negation 
rather than the falsum is primitive, then a much weaker consequence relation has exactly 
the same property. Whether we set out from the class of all sequent rules that are correct 
for that weak relation or from the class of all classically correct ones, restriction to the 
elementary rules among them gives us exactly the former. Thus, attributing a special 
epistemological role to elementary rules provides intuitionistic consequence with no 
greater claim on our allegiance than it does for the other, very weak consequence relation.  
  
Suppose, on the other hand, that we see the distinction between elementary and non-
elementary rules as merely a matter of relative simplicity: elementary sequent rules are 
just those dealing with the limiting case where the number of occurrences of connectives 
equals one and that occurrence is situated in the conclusion-sequent. From that 
perspective, our Theorem explains away an attraction of intuitionistic consequence: it is 
what we get when, with suitable choices of the notion of sequent and of primitive 
connectives, we restrict ourselves to the simplest among the classically correct sequent 
rules.  
 
Such a restriction can have computational advantages for those working in Prolog or 
logic programming. Moreover, in that community a rather surprising choice of language 
finds favour. Rules using set/set sequents are regarded as inconvenient, since they tend to 
make large demands on memory. Set/formula sequents, known to logic programmers as 
definite clauses, are easy to work with, but they are not very expressive, particularly for 
formulating constraints on rules. The optimum language is seen as that of set/formula-or-
empty sequents, where the right side may contain a single formula or be empty. 
Goldilocks style, this is more expressive than the language of set/formula sequents, yet 
more manageable than that of set/set sequents.  
 
How do elementary rules behave in the set/formula-or-empty context? As we saw when 
commenting on the Observation, introduction rules for contrarian connectives now exist. 
As noted in our comments on the Lemma, the intuitionistically correct elementary rules 
remain just the classically correct ones. Finally, in this context our Theorem holds in an 
even stronger form: irrespective of the choice of falsum or negation as primitive, 
intuitionistic propositional consequence is the least consequence relation over that 
language that satisfies all classically correct elementary rules. The reason why the 
theorem now applies even when negation is primitive is that the empty set on the right of 
sequents is able to effect, in structural rules, much of the work that primitive falsum 
would do in its elimination rules.  
 
To summarize the computational perspective, logic programmers find a certain practical 
advantage to working in a context (rules with set/formula-or-empty sequents) which, if 
one restricts the logical axioms to those of the simplest form (expressible as classically 
correct elementary rules), leads to intuitionistic rather than classical consequence 
irrespective of the choice of contrarian connective.        
 
In contrast, from a purely mathematical point of view, it is generally accepted that the 
most elegant language to use is that of set/set sequents, permitting exploitation of the full 
symmetry between left and right of a sequent. In this context, as is well known, the least 
relation that satisfies all classically correct elementary rules is just classical consequence 
itself, irrespective of whether negation or the falsum is taken as primitive. Any attempt to 
justify intuitionistic logic in terms of elementary rules in that context thus disappears, as 
an artifact of a mathematically unfortunate decision over choice of formal language.  
 
But it is also well known that the human mind has some difficulty manipulating set/set 
inferences with a disjunctive reading of the conclusion, perhaps because the disjunctive 
conceptualization requires some kind of parallel processing. This empirical fact is 
reflected in the practice of almost all introductory textbooks, whether written for students 
of philosophy, computer science or mathematics, of avoiding the set/set (or even 
set/formula-or-empty) mode of presentation in favour of the set/formula one.
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Given this situation, it is of interest to obtain a clear picture of the formal behaviour of 
elementary rules in the traditional set/formula context and in particular their connections 
with classical and intuitionistic consequence, as we have sought to do here.
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Notes 
 
1. See, for example, Sundholm 1983, Dummett 1991, Tennant 1997 and forthcoming, 
Read 2010, Milne 2002, Prawitz 2006, each with references to earlier work by the same 
and other authors.  
 
2. See for example van Dalen 1997 Sects 5.3–5.4, especially the completeness theorem 
5.3.10 and his remark on it in the last paragraph of Sect. 5.4. 
 
3. Strictly speaking, under our definitions, monotonicity is not a single rule but a 
countable collection of such rules with underlying tuples p1, … , pm  q / p1, … , pm, p 
 q, one for each choice of m  0. Similarly for all other rules using arbitrary finite sets 
of formulas. This multiplicity might be seen as rather awkward. It disappears if one takes 
a sequent-rule in a more customary manner as a syntactic item from the metalanguage, 
often known as a ‘rule scheme’, rather than as a set of items from the level of the object-
language (specifically, as the set of all substitution instances of a tuple of sequents). 
However, working with ‘rule schemes’ as metalanguage items brings its own 
inconvenience. As soon as one begins talking about rule schemes in general, one is forced 
to choose between pedantry and laxity, according to whether or not one systematically 
introduces meta-metalinguistic variables to range over those schemes and their various 
ingredients. The present formulation of the notion of a sequent rule permits a clean and 
rigorous proof of our desired theorem with minimal notational fuss. It should be 
emphasized, however, that the results of this paper continue to hold under the more 
customary ‘rule scheme’ formulation.  
 
4. In the context of logics where the rule of monotonicity fails, the term ‘consequence 
relation’ is often used in a broader sense, to cover any relation for which at least 
reflexivity holds. Those satisfying all three conditions of reflexivity, monotonicity and 
cumulative transitivity are then termed ‘closure relations’. However, in the present 
discussion, where we compare only classical and intuitionistic logic, we retain the more 
traditional terminology.     
 
5. Curiously, Prawitz 1965, Sect. II.1 describes the intuitionistically correct rule    
as falling ‘outside the division into I- and E-rules’. Elementary rules as defined here are 
both ‘pure’ and ‘simple’ in the sense of Dummett 1991, and correspond, in the context of 
sequent-to-sequent rules, to the ‘immediate’ rules in Tennant 1997, p. 316.  
 
6. Care needs to be taken in interpreting statements in this area. For example, Tennant has 
declared that ‘Every logical operator enjoys an Introduction rule and a corresponding 
Elimination rule’ (Tennant forthcoming, Sect. 6.2, with italics in the original). At first 
sight, this appears to be falsified by the absence of any classically correct introduction 
rule for contrarian connectives. But reading the claim in the light of Tennant 1997 Sect. 
10.3 suggests that it is intended in the context of set/formula-or-empty sequents, with 
used on the right of a sequent as a non-standard notation for the empty set. In that 
context our Observation does not hold, as mentioned in the text. Nevertheless, even there 
Tennant's claim loses much of its philosophical bite when we consider the cases of  and 
T. It is easy to show that for set/formula-or-empty sequents, any classically correct 
introduction rule for or elimination rule for T) is degenerate in the sense defined in 
section 2: it is already an instance of the classically correct structural rule obtained by 
taking the underlying tuple for the given rule and replacing  (or T) by a sentence letter 
not occurring elsewhere in the tuple.   
 
7. In the limiting case that A is empty, A is understood to be the formula . For the 
conjunction of individual formulas ,  the standard notation is of course , but Mind 
house rules have required the authors to use an ampersand.  
 
8. This result is established for rules governing and & and  in Belnap and Thomason 
1963 using proof-theoretic arguments, and is extended in Hazen 1990 to cover the case of 
implications between {&, }-formulas. A simple proof using Kripke models for the {&, 
, -fragment, which extends unproblematically to the addition of , is given in 7.14 
of Humberstone forthcoming. 
 
9. Rules with a unique occurrence of the connective on the left of a premiss-sequent 
include those called ‘oblique’ in Dummett 1991 pp. 257, 297. 
 
10. This is not the only area of logic in which the presence or absence of  as a primitive 
connective has significant consequences. In modal propositional logic it affects the 
structure of the lattice of all modal logics, as was observed in Makinson 1973; see also 
Humberstone 1993. Other examples of unexpected effects of changing primitives are 
referenced from the literature in Humberstone forthcoming Subsect. 7.13. 
 
11. We sketch a proof that for the relation defined we have neither p  p nor even   
pp&p). Consider a semantics that is just like the classical, except that when v() 
= 0 then  v() may take value 1 or 0, chosen freely according to the choice of formula  
(so that the negations of different occurrences of the same formula get the same value, 
but negations of logically equivalent formulas need not). Clearly, neither of the two 
sequents above is valid under this semantics, while it is not difficult, though rather 
tedious, to show that every classically correct elementary rule is correct under it. On the 
other hand, if we admit empty right hand sides to sequents, then we admit the elementary 
rules A,   A   and A   / A,   , which are used in Dummett 2000, 
Sect. 4.2 page 97, to axiomatize intuitionistic consequence. Thus there are two distinct 
ways of using elementary rules to get intuitionistic out of classical consequence: (1) from 
the set of all classically correct elementary rules with set/formula sequents and falsum 
primitive, and (2) from the set of all classically correct elementary rules but with 
set/formula-or-empty sequents and negation primitive. The latter appears to be the avenue 
favoured by Tennant 1997, esp. Sect. 10.3. 
 
12. We recall a well-known derivation of p  pfrom classically correct elementary 
rules when  is taken as primitive and  is defined, which brings out the role played by 
the introduction and elimination rules for . Under the definition, p  p abbreviates 
p  (p). Now p, p   is an instance of the classically correct zero-premiss 
elimination rule for with underlying 1-tuple p, pq  q. Also, p, p   /  p  
(p) is an instance of the classically correct one-premiss introduction rule for 
with underlying 2-tuple p, q  r / p  qr. Applying the latter to the former gives p 
 (p) as desired. See Béziau 1999 and Humberstone 2005 for further discussion 
of the way in which  may inherit properties from the behaviour of  when defined in 
terms of it. 
 
13. See e.g. Restall 2005 for an epistemological defense of multiple conclusions, and 
Steinberger 2011 for an opposing view. 
 
14. The authors wish to thank two anonymous referees and the Editor for valuable 
comments that helped improve the paper. Discussions with Marek Sergot helped clarify 
the use of set/formula-or-empty sequents in logic programming.   
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